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Abstract. We consider repeated communication sessions between a RFID
Tag (e.g., Radio Frequency Identification, RFID Tag) and a RFID Veri-
fier. A proactive information theoretic security scheme is proposed. The
scheme is based on the assumption that the information exchanged dur-
ing at least one of every n successive communication sessions is not ex-
posed to an adversary. The Tag and the Verifier maintain a vector of
n entries that is repeatedly refreshed by pairwise xoring entries, with a
new vector of n entries that is randomly chosen by the Tag and sent to
the Verifier as a part of each communication session.
The general case in which the adversary does not listen in k ≥ 1 sessions
among any n successive communication sessions is also considered. A
lower bound of n ·(k+1) for the number of random numbers used during
any n successive communication sessions is proven. In other words, we
prove that an algorithm must use at least n·(k+1) new random numbers
during any n successive communication sessions. Then a randomized
scheme that uses only O(n log n) new random numbers is presented.
A computational secure scheme which is based on the information the-
oretic secure scheme is used to ensure that even in the case that the
adversary listens in all the information exchanges, the communication
between the Tag and the Verifier is secure.
Keywords:Authentication protocol, information theoretic security, com-
putational security, RFID tags, pseudo-random numbers.
1 Introduction
RFID tag is a small microchip, supplemented with an antenna, that transmits a
unique identifier in response to a query by a reading device. The RFID technology
is designed for the unique identification of different kinds of objects. According
⋆ Partially supported by Microsoft, IBM, NSF, Intel, Deutsche Telekom, Rita Altura
Trust Chair in Computer Sciences, Intel, vaatat and Lynne and William Frankel
Center for Computer Sciences.
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to [15], RFID communication systems are composed of three major elements:
(a) RFID Tag carries object identifying data; (b) RFID Verifier interfaces with
Tags to read or write Tag data; (c) the back-end database aggregates and utilizes
Tag data collected by Verifiers.
The RFID Verifier broadcasts an RF signal to access data stored on the tags
that usually includes a unique identification number. RFID tags are designed as
low cost devices that use cheap radio transmission media. Such tags have no (or a
very limited) internal source of power. However they receive their power from the
reading devices. The range of the basic tags transmission is up to several meters.
Possible applications of the RFID devices include: RFID-enabled banknotes, li-
braries, passports, pharmaceutical distribution of drugs, and organization of the
automobile security system or any key-less entry system. Nevertheless, the wide
deployment of RFID tags may cause new security and privacy protecting issues.
RFID tags usually operate in insecure environment. The RFID tag privacy may
be compromised by the adversary that extracts unencrypted data from the un-
protected tags. RFID tags are limited devices that cannot support complicated
cryptographic functions. Hence, there is growing interest in achieving high secu-
rity and privacy level for the RFID devices, without usage of computationally
expensive encryption techniques.
The focus of our paper is the authentication schemes for passive RFID tags.
We present new proactive and cost effective information theoretic and compu-
tationally secure authentication protocols for RFIDs. The main scope is one
sided authentication, where the Verifier has to identify the Tag. Such (non mu-
tual) one sided authentication is useful in applications in which the Tag may
have other means to identify (that it is communicating with) the desired Verifier
(say by being geographically close to the Verifier). Note that a simple exten-
sion in which symmetric authentication scheme obtains mutual authentication
is also presented in the sequel. The protocol that copes with the Intruder-in the
Middle-Attack (IIMA) is introduced as the extended version of the computa-
tionally secure protocol.
Background and related work.
• Security protocols based on standard cryptographic techniques.
A brief introduction to RFID technology appears in [15] where potential se-
curity and privacy risks are described. Schemes for providing desired security
properties in the unique setting of low-cost RFID devices are discussed in [15].
The main security risks stated in that paper are the violations of “location
privacy” and denial of service that disables the tags. With the RFID resource
constraints in mind, the cryptography techniques proposed in [15] for develop-
ing the RFID security mechanisms are: (a) a simple access mechanism based
on hardware-efficient one-way hash functions, low-cost traditional symmetric
encryption schemes, randomizing tag responses based on random number gen-
erator; (b) integrating RFID systems with a key management infrastructure.
Regardless of the mechanisms used for privacy and access control, management
of tag keys is an important issue. The new challenge in the RFID system design
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is to provide access control and key management tools compatible with the tags
cost constraints.
An adversary model adapted to RFID protocols is introduced in [1]. Many
existing privacy protecting RFID protocols are examined for their traceability.
Traceability is defined as the capability of the adversary to recognize a tag which
the adversary has already seen, at another time or in another location [1]. The
traceability is stated as a serious problem related to the privacy protection in the
RFID systems. The paper concludes that in a realistic model, many protocols
are not resistant to traceability.
• Security protocols based on low cost arithmetic computations.
The research survey in [11] examines different approaches proposed by researches
for providing privacy protection and integrity assurance in RFID systems. In
order to define the notions of “secure” and “private” for RFID tags, a formal
model that characterizes the capabilities of potential adversaries is proposed. The
author states that it is important to adapt RFID security models to cope with
the weakness of the RFID devices. A few weak security models which reflect real
threats and tag capabilities are discussed. A “minimalist” security model which
serves low-cost tags is introduced in [12]. The basic model assumption is that
the potential RFID adversary is necessarily weaker than the one in traditional
cryptography. Besides, such an adversary comes into scanning range of a tag only
periodically. The minimalist model aims to take into account the RFID adversary
characteristics. Therefore, this model is not perfect, but it eliminates some of the
standard cryptographic assumptions that may be not appropriate for deployment
in other security systems which are based on a more powerful adversary model.
The author of [12] states that standard cryptographic functionality is not needed
to achieve necessary security in RFID tags.
• Protocols overview.
Existing techniques and secure protocols proposed for implementation in existing
RFID systems are described next.
An inexpensive RFID tag known as Electronic Product Code (EPC) tag is
proposed in [10] to protect against RFID tag cloning. Basic EPC tags do possess
features geared toward privacy protection and access control mechanisms, nev-
ertheless they do not possess explicit authentication functionality. That is, EPC
standards prescribe no mechanism for RFID-EPC verifiers to authenticate the
validity of the tags they scan. The authors show how to construct tag-to-verifier
and verifier-to-tag authentication protocols.
However, the security analysis of the Digital Signature Transponder (DST)
RFID tags is described in [3]. The authors present in detail the successful strat-
egy for defeating the security of an RFID device known as Digital Signature
Transponder. The main conclusion of [3] is that the DST tags are no longer
secure due to the tags weakness caused by the inadequate short key length of
40 bits. Note that it is possible to increase the computational security level by
increasing the length of the key. Still the resulting scheme will not be informa-
tion theoretic secure but only computationally secure. Hence, it is of interest
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to design a proactive information theoretic secure scheme within computational
secure scheme as we do in the sequel.
We also detail a new way to use watermarks technique to cope with IIMA
even for the case there is only one message sent during a communication ses-
sion (unlike [12,8] where the exchange of three messages is required). The new
scheme is based on expanding each message to be a codeword with error correct-
ing bits. Thus, enforcing an attacker to change at least a number of bits equal to
the minimal Hamming distance between two codewords. In addition watermarks
bits are produced by pseudo-random sequence and inserted in the message in
specific locations defined by pseudo-random sequences. The operations for pro-
ducing watermarked messages are based only on xor operations and the usage
of pseudo-random sequences, rather than using cryptographic hash functions.
Note that one can use symmetric authentication scheme to obtain mutual au-
thentication of the Tag and the Verifier. The mutual authentication scheme
allows the Verifier to produce random bits for the Tag, as well. Obviously, com-
putational security “envelop” can be implemented for the symmetric version
as well, resulting in a proactive computational secure symmetric scheme. We
present in detail the one sided authentication, for readability purposes.
Our contribution. Our goal in this paper is to design new algorithms for
providing authentication for the computationally limited basic RFID systems
with a small amount of storage capability.
We propose a new security protecting model that is information theoretic and
computationally secure. The security power of the basic and combined authen-
tication protocols is provided by maintaining at the Tag and the Verifier’s sides
n-dimensional vector ARV . The appropriate vector-entry is used as the secret
key for performing the authentication procedure by the RFID Tag. The vector
ARV is updated by performing xor of corresponding entries with randomly cho-
sen new n dimensional vector at any communication session. Our work is mostly
related to the schemes presented in [6] and filed as patent [7]. In this paper we
present here an equivalent solution that maintains only a vector of n numbers
instead of O(n2) numbers. In addition we present a new algorithm that uses
randomization in order to reduce the communication during a session from O(n)
numbers to O(log n) numbers.
The basic information theoretic secure protocol AP1 is based on the limited
adversarial capabilities. The underlining assumption of this protocol is that the
adversary is not listening in at least one of each n successive interactions between
the Tag and the Verifier. In essence, AP1 protocol extends the “minimalist” secu-
rity model in [12] and the assumptions made in [18]. The underlying assumption
of AP1 is that each communication session is atomic. We mean that the adver-
sary cannot modify part of the communication in a session. The adversary may
either listen in the communication during a session, or try to communicate (on
behalf of the RFID Tag) during an entire session. This is a common situation in
the case of personal identification, when an adversary cannot be present when
the user is. Compared with [12] our scheme is not based on an oracle which
provides the number of sessions in which the adversary listens in following the
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last refresh. Our scheme works when we do not know explicitly which session the
adversary is not listening in. In other words, [12] needs to identify such a ses-
sion in order to renew the security level in this session while our scheme renews
the security level without the need to identify such a particular secure session.
Moreover, the security failure in a certain session does not bear on successful
implementation of the next sessions since our algorithms are proactive.
A proactive information theoretic security scheme is proposed. According
to [4] proactive security provides a method for maintaining the overall security
of a system, even when individual components are repeatedly broken into and
controlled by an attacker. The automated recovery of the security is provided
by our scheme. The scheme is based on the assumption that the information
exchanged during at least one of every n successive communication sessions is
not exposed to an adversary. The vector is refreshed by pairwise xor−ing entries,
with a new vector of n entries that is randomly chosen by the Tag and sent to
the Verifier as a part of each communication session.
The general case in which the adversary does not listen in k ≥ 1 sessions
among any n successive communication sessions is also considered. We prove
an n · (k + 1) lower bound for the number of random numbers required when a
deterministic version of our scheme is used. The lower bound is on the number of
new random numbers used during any n successive communication sessions. In
other words we prove that any deterministic algorithm will use at least n · (k +
1) random numbers during any n successive communication sessions. Then we
present a randomized scheme that uses only logarithmic in n random numbers in
each communication session, assuming the adversary does not listen in a bounded
fixed portion of any n successive communication sessions.
The restriction imposed on the adversary is dropped in the combined proac-
tive computational secure protocol AP2 that operates successfully even if the
adversary has gotten access to any number of successive interactions between
the Tag and the Verifier. We extended AP2 to a version A˜P2 that does not rely
on atomic sessions and is computationally resistant against active IIMAs. The
proactive combined computational secure protocol has several advantages.
Low computational cost combined with a high security level. Our al-
gorithms continuously use random numbers generator as a source for preserving
the security level ([9]). Low computational power is required compared with the
standard cryptographic techniques like stream and block ciphers.
Protocols’ robustness. Our proactive computational secure protocol is not
based on the refreshing procedure as suggested in [12]. The refreshing procedure
in [12] provides the complete initialization of the protocol’s secure parameters
assuming there is an oracle that identifies sessions in which the adversary is not
listening in. Namely, the refresh is done via a secure channel. Our model pro-
vides high computational security level by involving a trusted party only during
initialization, without identifying a particular session as a secure session.
Functionality in the proactive mode. Any listening adversary’s success
and consequent protocol’s security failure do not affect further functionality of
the protocol. Recovery from a failure (assuming non fatal effect of failures) is
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automatic. That is to say, assuming that no fatal damage is caused when the ad-
versary reveals the clear text, the future communication security is established.
Possibility of proactive information theoretic security within computa-
tional security. Our second protocol AP2 assumes that if the adversary was not
listening in at least one session among n consecutive sessions between the RFID
Tag and the RFID Verifier, the proposed protocol automatically becomes infor-
mation theoretic and computationally secure and therefore the original security
level is established. Thus, an adversary that starts processing the communica-
tion information in order to break the computational security based scheme, will
have to start from scratch after any session the adversary did not listen in. This
fact can be used, in turn, to reduce the number of random bits used with relation
to an only computational secure scheme. Assume that there is some probability
for value of n to be the correct number of sessions for which the adversary does
not listen in at least one session. Assume further that there is a larger definite
upper bound, n′ ≥ n, that may depend on a stricter consideration, (say battery
lifetime). In such a case it is possible to tune the computational security level of
AP2 to fit the need to secure the sessions in which the protocol is not informa-
tion theoretic secure, taking in account the probability that the adversary will
indeed be present in n′ (or less) successive sessions.
High level of the computational resistance against active IIMAs. Se-
curity against IIMAs of the updated A˜P2 is achieved by means of the low cost
xor-based techniques of the redundant coding [17] and digital watermarking [2].
The techniques used by A˜P2 loosens the assumption on the atomicity of any
session. A protocol that is resistant to IIMAs is proposed in [12]. The protocol is
based on the three-way mutual authentication procedure between the RFID Tag
and the RFID Verifier. The protocol’s computational security power is achieved
by means of one-time pads that encapsulate the secret keys, and by the con-
stant keys updating in each communication session. Another such protocol that
is based on three message exchanges in each session is proposed in [8]. This
protocol is provably secure based on the hardness of the Learning Parity in the
Presence of Noise problem. Compared with [12] and [8] our A˜P2 protocol can be
used for one way authentication with only one message exchange for session, or
two-way authentication using two messages. Thus, our scheme is also applicable
in the cases in which the RFID Verifier does not send messages to the RFID
Tag.
We believe that our protocols are useful in several domains including remote
keys, e.g., automobile security system, in particular the mutual authentication
versions of our protocols.
Paper organization. The formal system description appears in Section 2. The
basic information theoretic secure protocol AP1 is introduced in Section 3. The
case in which the adversary does not listen in k > 1 sessions of any n successive
sessions is investigated in Section 4. The combined computational secure protocol
AP2 is described in Section 5. The improved resistant against Intruder-in the-
Middle Attack A˜P 2 protocol is introduced in Section 6. The Conclusions in
Section 7 complete the paper.
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2 Security Model for RFID Tags
We consider the (RFID) Tag and the (RFID) Verifier. The Tag and the Verifier
communicate by sending and receiving messages according to their predefined
programs, that form together a communication protocol. We denote the ith mes-
sage sent by the Tag and by the Verifier as si and ri, respectively. The sequence
of alternating messages M = s1, r1, s2, r2, · · · sent during the course of the pro-
tocol execution can be divided into non overlapping subsequences, so that each
subsequence Si = sik , rik is called communication session. The union of the com-
munication sessions forms the entire sequence of messagesM . Each Si starts with
a message sent by the Tag and ends when the Verifier decides to send a message
rik=Open or rik=DoNotOpen. In fact, the Open message can be viewed as an
electrical signal to the door of the car. Any message sk sent by the RFID Tag is
defined as a key message. Actually, the message rik represents a change in the
state of the Verifier which corresponds to the Tag authentication as the one that
may enter to use a resource.
We assume a Byzantine adversary that listens in part or in all of sequence
M and may try to send complete messages on behalf of the Tag. The goal of the
adversary is either making the Verifier send message r = Open or driving the
Verifier into a state after which the Verifier will not send the message r = Open
to the Tag. Given the features of the proposed model, we describe basic and
combined authentication protocols. The first basic authentication protocol AP1
is the proactive information theoretic secure protocol. The information theoretic
security feature of this protocol is provided by the assumption that within any
n consecutive communication sessions Si1 = si1 , ri1 , · · ·Sin = sin , rin there is at
least one message sik sent by the RFID Tag which the adversary is not aware of.
The strict limitation imposed on the adversary is relaxed in the combined com-
putational secure protocol AP2. The security power of AP1 and AP2 protocols is
based on random numbers generation and their updating at each communication
session. AP1 and AP2 are introduced and analyzed in the next sections.
3 Proactive Information Theoretic Secure Protocol
The proactive theoretic information secure protocol AP1 is described in Figure
1. Denote the accumulated random vector as ARV [1..n] and the last random
vector that updates ARV vector during the i − th communication session as
LRV i[1..n].
At the initialization stage the Tag and the Verifier both get a unique vector
ARV [1..n] (lines 1-2). In order to perform the authentication procedure, the
Tag starts the communication session and passes to the Verifier the key message
s1 = (ARV [n], LRV
1[1..n]) (lines 6-8, Protocol for RFID Tag).
After transmitting the first key message s1, the Tag and the Verifier, respec-
tively, initialize ARV [n] to zero and update ARV [1..n] vector by calculating xor
of each entry with the corresponding entry of LRV 1[1..n].
During the next authentication session the Tag and the Verifier repeat the
same procedure: the Tag generates a new random n-dimensional vector
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LRV 2[1..n], and sends the newly generated key message
s2 = (ARV [n − 1], LRV
2[1..n]), where the value in ARV [n − 1] serves as the
key. Then the new accumulated random vector ARV [1..n] is equal to the xor
of the accumulated random vector used at the previous communication session,
with the newly generated new random vector LRV 2[1..n].
The Verifier generates the response message r2 as either Open orDoNotOpen
(lines 8, 10).
The authentication procedure is repeated continually scanning the vector
ARV [1..n] entries (one after the other) and updating ARV [1..n]′s entries by
initializing the lastly sent value to 0 and calculating xor of its entries with the
corresponding entries of the newly randomly generated vector. After each ith
authentication success both the Tag and the Verifier, respectively, initialize the
ARV [1..n] entry used in i−th authentication session, to 0. The vector ARV [1..n]
is updated by calculating xor of each entry with the corresponding entry of the
vector LRV i[1..n]. Note that LRV i[1..n] has been previously randomly gener-
ated by the Tag and has been sent to the Verifier in the message si−1. The
updating procedure and calculation of xor for the corresponding ARV [1..n] en-
try are described in lines u1-u5.
In order to confirm the correct authentication, the RFID Verifier executes
the authentication procedure in the following manner: upon receiving the key
message si =
(
ARV [n− (i − 1)], LRV i[1..n]
)
the Verifier verifies that ARV [n−
(i − 1)]′s value is the correct (n − (i − 1)(mod(n)))th entry. If so, the Verifier
confirms the correct authentication, “transmits” to the Tag the message ri =
Open and updates the vector ARV [1..n] (lines 4-9, Protocol for RFID Verifier).
Otherwise, the Verifier “transmits” to the Tag the message ri = DoNotOpen
and does not update the vector ARV [1..n].
Assume that during the course of executing AP1 it holds that in any sequence
of alternating messages M = s1, r1, s2, r2, . . . the following condition is satisfied:
in any n-length sequence M of alternating messages between the Tag and the
Verifier there is at least a single message sjk not captured by the adversary.
Assume that in order to break the security system of the RFID Verifier, the
adversary performs authentication procedure on behalf of the RFID Tag. To
do so in any Sthj communication session the adversary has to forge the key
message sji , namely, to correctly guess the value of the corresponding (n− (ji−
1)(mod(n)))th entry of ARV [1..n].
Assume that the single unknown to the adversary key is the nth entry of
ARV [1..n], namely ARV [n] and the appropriate vector is LRV 1[1..n] that has
been sent by the Tag in the message s1 = (ARV [n], LRV
1[1..n]) during the first
communication session.
After transmitting the first key message s1 the Tag and the Verifier update
the vector ARV [1..n] according to the updating procedure described in lines
u1-u5.
Note that in the next trial the Tag will send to the Verifier the updated
(n − 1)th ARV ′s entry that is equal to ARV [n − 1] used in the previous com-
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Protocol for RFID Tag
1: Initialization:
2: Create int array ARV [1..n]
3: int i := 1;
4: Upon user request
5: keyentry = n− (i− 1)mod n
6: Create new random array LRV
7: Send s = (ARV [keyentry], LRV )
8: to Verifier
9: If Open received
10: Call Updating procedure
11: End user request
u1: Updating procedure
u2: ARV [keyentry] = 0
u3: for all j 1 ≤ j ≤ n
u4: ARV [j] = ARV [j]⊕ LRV [j]
u5: i := i+ 1
Protocol for RFID Verifier
1: Initialization:
2: Create int array ARV [1..n]
3: int i := 1;
4: Upon reception of key message
5: keyentry = n− (i− 1)mod n
6: s = (X,LRV )
7: if X = ARV [keyentry]
8: Send Open and
9: Call Updating procedure
10: else Send DoNotOpen
11: End of key message reception
u1: Updating procedure
u2: ARV [keyentry] = 0
u3: for all j 1 ≤ j ≤ n
u4: ARV [j] = ARV [j]⊕ LRV [j]
u5: i := i+ 1
Fig. 1: Proactive Information Theoretic Secure Protocol AP1.
munication session, xor − ed with (n − 1) − th entry of the new last randomly
generated vector LRV 2.
Now vector ARV [1..n] is equal to the previous one with the initialized entry
ARV [n − 1] = 0 xor − ed with the vector LRV 2[1..n]. The vector ARV [1..n]
updating is done by the Tag and the Verifier in each successful communication
session.
The AP1 authentication protocol is information theoretic secure. This means
that the probability that the adversary will forge the key message and perform
the communication session on behalf of the RFID Tag successfully, is 2−l which
is negligible for a long enough l, where l is the number of bits of the entry in the
vector ARV .
The following Theorem proves that the introduced protocol is information
theoretic secure.
Theorem 1 AP1 protocol is information theoretic secure with a security pa-
rameter l that is related to the number of bits in a key message, and proactive
under the following assumptions:
(i) The information exchanged during at least one of every n successive commu-
nication sessions is not exposed to an adversary;
(ii) Each session is atomic.
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Proof: The AP1 information security feature is based on the fact that at any
authentication step i the following conditions hold: (a) the RFID Tag and the
RFID Verifier maintain the same vector ARV [1..n]; (b) The Tag and the Verifier
are synchronized in the sense that both the Tag and the Verifier perform the
authentication procedure using as a key the same n− (i− 1)(mod(n)) entry; (c)
the vector ARV [1..n] shared by the Tag and the Verifier contains at least one
entry unknown to the adversary.
The proof continues by induction over the session number i.
Basis of induction i = 1:
(a) As it has been mentioned above, the first key message
s1 = (ARV [n], LRV
1) at the first communication session S1 contains ARV [n]
that is unknown to the adversary. Evidently, the Tag and the Verifier maintain
the same vector ARV [1..n] that has been defined at the initialization stage when
the adversary was not present.
(b) The Tag and the Verifier are synchronized because the first key message
that the Tag sends to the Verifier and that the Verifier expects to receive is
ARV [n] which is the nth entry of the vector ARV [1..n] .
(c) Due to the initialization procedure, the vector ARV [1..n] granted to both
the Tag and the Verifier, is entirely unknown to the adversary.
Induction step: (a) Assume that during every i < n communication sessions
the Tag and the Verifier maintain the same vector ARV [1..n]. Then the vector
ARV [1..n] shared by the Tag and the Verifier during the next i, i ≥ n commu-
nication session will differ from the previous one by appropriate initializing of
the used n− (i− 1)(mod(n)) − th entry of ARV [1..n] and respective xor − ing
of each ARV [1..n]− th entry with the corresponding entry of the vector LRV i
that has been sent to Verifier in the previous communication session.
(b) Assume that during any i < n communication session the Tag and the
Verifier agree on the same ARV [1..n]th entry n−(i−1)(mod(n)) that is the basis
for constructing the key message. Then, at the next (i + 1)th communication
session the entry number is reduced by 1 mod(n). As a result, the basis for
constructing the key message at the Tag and the Verifier’ sides, respectively, is
the same ARV ′s n− (i− 2)(mod(n)) entry.
(c) For i < n all the entries of the ARV vector in each communication
session Sj among i communication sessions S1, . . . , Si are unknown to the ad-
versary. The induction assumption is correct due to the initialization procedure
performed by the Tag and the Verifier, respectively. In addition, for any i ≥ n
the basic condition that for each ith communication session ARV [1..n]th entries
are unknown to the adversary also holds. It is based on the assumption that
among any n successive communication sessions there is at least a single session
that the adversary was not eavesdropping.
Let us prove the information theoretic feature of AP1. Assume, that among
n successive communication sessions Si, Si+1, ...Si+n−1 the adversary was aware
of a certain Si+k session. In order to provide the authentication procedure on
behalf of the Tag during any insecure communication session Si+k+j from n− 1
following insecure sessions Si+k+1, Si+k+2, ... Si+k+n−1 sessions, the adversary
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has to correctly guess the n− (i+ k− 1)mod n entry of the vector LRV i+k[1..n]
that securely refreshed ARV [1..n] of the Tag and the Verifier, respectively during
Si+k. Assuming the uniform distribution of the bits in the entry, the probability
that the adversary will correctly guess the n− (i+ k− 1) entry, is equal to 2−l,
where l is the number of bits in the entry.
The AP1 proactive feature is proven in the following way. Assume that the
adversary has gotten access to the whole vector ARV [1..n]. Assume that in the
jth communication session Sj that follows this security failure, the adversary was
not listening in to the message sj sent by the RFID Tag. In essence, during any
of the following (j + i)th session, i ≥ 1 each ARV [1..n]th entry is xor − ed with
corresponding entry of the LRV j . Note that the adversary was not listening in
LRV j . Therefore, the basic condition, that within n consecutive messages sent
from the Tag to the Verifier there is at least a single message unknown to the
adversary, is restored. As a result, the information theoretic security feature of
AP1 is regained.
Assume that the adversary tends to drive the RFID Verifier to a deadlock
state after which the Tag will not be able to cause the Verifier to send a message
r=Open. Due to the session atomicity assumption, in order to do so the adversary
must corrupt the vector ARV , say, by inserting a new value in ARV entry on
behalf of the RFID Tag. Nevertheless, the adversary will fail in this attempt
because in order to insert a new entry in the vector ARV the adversary has to
authenticate himself or herself on behalf of the RFID Tag. The message sj that
the adversary has to send to the Verifier must include the correct ARV ′s entry.
As a matter of fact, AP1 has two parameters. The first parameter is vector’
ARV size n. The larger n is, the weaker the assumption about the adversary
is. The price paid for large n is the additional memory used in the restricted
memory size of the RFID devices. The second secure parameter is the number
of bits l of an entry in ARV . The longer ARV ′s entries are, the smaller the
probability for the adversary to guess the correct key is.
Note that when the assumption concerning one session in each sequential
session, in which the adversary does not listen in, is violated, then the adversary
can drive the system into a deadlock by, say, replacing ARV ′s entries, by entries
unknown to the Verifier.
4 Generalizing the Private Sessions Definition
This section generalizes the 1 out of n private communication session assumption.
Consider the cases in which k ≥ 1 out of n successive sessions are private, namely
the adversary is not listening in k out of any n successive sessions. In such cases
the number of random numbers sent in each communication session may be
reduced. First we prove a lower bound on the total number of random numbers
which should be sent during n successive sessions.
For proving a lower bound on the number of random numbers that should be
sent during n successive sessions, consider schemes for which the vector-entries
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that are chosen to be refreshed by random numbers which are specified by a
deterministic function. A vector entry is refreshed by xor − ing a new random
number to the current vector entry or assigning the entry by a random number.
We show that at least n · (k + 1) new random numbers should be used during
any n successive communication sessions.
Consider any n successive communication sessions. There are n− k sessions
in which the adversary may listen in. Since we assume that the adversary knows
the scheme, the scheme must introduce at least n − k + 1 refreshes for each
vector-entry between any two successive usages of a vector-entry. Thus the total
number of refreshes in n successive sessions is at least n ·(n−k+1) which implies
at least n− k + 1 or more refreshes in a single session.
The above lower bound is based on deterministic choices of a refresh sequence
which is known to the adversary. In fact it is possible to use a randomized scheme,
in which the vector-entries that are chosen to be refreshed by random numbers,
are randomly chosen. Assume that the adversary does not know the identity of
the randomly chosen vector-entries that are refreshed during the communication
sessions the adversary is not listening in. We show that it is possible to send only
(2n/k)(logn) random numbers in each session. Thus, for a given (say, bounded
by a constant) fraction of private communication pcf = n/k, the number of
random numbers that need to be sent in n successive communication sessions,
is reduced from n · (n − n/pcf + 1) to 2n · pcf · logn. Note that when pcf is a
constant these numbers are O(n2) and O(n logn), respectively.
The randomized scheme chooses in each communication session 2 logn vector-
entries and sends 2 logn random numbers to be xor−ed with the corresponding
vector-entries, sending the indices of the chosen vector-entries as well. We show
that each entry is refreshed with high probability during the k private commu-
nication sessions that immediately precede it.
We now show that the probability that at least one refresh for each vector-
entry takes place, is close to 1. The probability that a certain entry is not re-
freshed is less than (1 − 1/n)2n logn (the inequality is due to the fact that dur-
ing one communication session no vector-entry is refreshed twice). Given that
(1 − 1/n)2n log n ≤ e−2 logn = 1/n2, it holds that the probability that all vector
entries are refreshed is greater than 1−Σni=11/n
2 = 1− 1/n.
5 Combined Computational Secure Protocol
We now allow the adversary to listen in any session between the RFID Tag and
the RFID Verifier. Our purpose is to enhance the basic proactive information
theoretic secure protocol AP1.
As in the AP1 case, both the Tag and the Verifier get the initial n-dimensional
vector ARV in the initialization stage (Figure 2, lines 1-4). In addition k (a small
number much less than 2k) bits different commands keywords are granted to the
RFID Tag and the RFID Verifier, respectively. These commands will be executed
by the Verifier upon the Tag authentication. In the sequel, when no confusion
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Protocol for RFID Tag
1: Initialization:
2: Create int vector array ARV [1..n]
3: int i := 1; seed := 0
4: int vector arrays keywords
5: Upon user request
6: Create new random array LRV
7: keyentry = n− (i− 1)mod n
8: X[keyentry] = ARV [keyentry]
9: Create pseudo-random sequence
10: prs of length m from
11: seed = X[keyentry]⊕ seed
12: Y = (LRV ||keyword)⊕ prs
13: Send Y to Verifier
14: If Open received
15: Call Updating procedure
16: End user request
u1: Updating procedure
u2: ARV [keyentry] = 0
u3: for all j 1 ≤ j ≤ n
u4: ARV [j] = ARV [j]⊕ LRV [j]
u5: i := i+ 1
Protocol for RFID Verifier
1: Initialization:
2: Create int vector array ARV [1..n]
3: int i := 1; seed := 0
4: int vector arrays keywords
5: Upon key message Y reception
6: keyentry = n− (i− 1)mod n
7: Create pseudo-random sequence
8: prs of length m from
9: seed = Y [keyentry]⊕ seed
10: Z = Y ⊕ prs
11: if Z[(n+ 1)..m] ∈ keywords
12: Send Open and
13: Call Updating procedure
14: else
15: Send DoNotOpen
16: End of key message reception
u1: Updating procedure
u2: ARV [keyentry] = 0
u3: for all j 1 ≤ j ≤ n
u4: ARV [j] = ARV [j]⊕ Z[j]
u5: i := i+ 1
Fig. 2: Proactive Computational Secure Protocol AP2.
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is possible the keyword used in this paper is Open; the DoNotOpen keyword is
used to refer to the situation in which the keyword is not a valid command.
During the first authentication session the Tag executes the following en-
cryption procedure: New vector row LRV [1..n] is also created as in the proac-
tive information theoretic secure protocol case. The nth ARV ′s entry ARV [n] is
used as a seed for the generation of the pseudo-random sequence prs of length
m = n · l + k, where k is the keyword length and l is the length in bits of each
ARV vector entry. See [14], Chapter 12 for possible choices of the generation
mechanism of the pseudo-random numbers.
The Tag creates a new vector row Y that should be sent to the Verifier in
the first authentication message. Y is equal to xor of the previously generated
pseudo-random sequence prs with vector LRV 1 concatenated with the keyword:
Y1 = prs⊕ (LRV
1‖keyword) (Figure 2 lines 5-12). Eventually, the secure infor-
mation encapsulation is provided. The first key message sent from the Tag to
the Verifier during the first communication session is s1 = Y (Figure 2, Protocol
for RFID Tag, line 13). It is assumed that both the Tag and the Verifier know
the pseudo-random sequence procedure that produces prs.
Upon receiving the message s1 = Y the Verifier decrypts s1 by calculating
Y ⊕ prs. If the decrypted suffix of the string is equal to the predefined string
keyword, then the Verifier authenticates the Tag and returns the message r1 =
Open to the Tag. The updating of the vector ARV is provided by the prefix
of the decrypted string as in the basic information theoretic secure protocol.
Otherwise, the message r1 = DoNotOpen is sent to the Tag (lines 5-16, RFID
Verifier). The Updating procedure is described in lines u1-u4.
During any ith authentication session Si, i = 1, 2, . . . the message si sent by
the Tag equals the xor of the pseudo-random sequence prs with the updated ith
stage accumulated random vector ARV concatenated with the keyword string.
Here prs is the pseudo-random sequence generated by the seed = X [keyentry]⊕
seed, while the initial seed value is initialized to zero and keyentry = n − (i −
1)mod n. LRV is a newly generated random vector that updates the vectorARV .
It should be noted that the keyword and the one way function that generates
the pseudo-random numbers can be known to the adversary. The computational
security of the designed AP2 protocol is provided by means of the random seed
generation in each session. Moreover, the recursive reuse of the seeds used in
the previous communication sessions enhances the security of AP2 where the
adversary never listens in.
As a matter of fact, the seed X [1] used in the first communication session
S1 is unknown to the adversary. The reason is that the adversary had not been
present at the initialization stage. Therefore, the initial ARV ′s entries are not
available for the adversary. The seed updating is performed continuously in each
communication session. Hence, the adversary does not get enough time to guess
the secret seeds by observing the transmitted messages.
In essence, the encryption scheme is based on the message encapsulation by
means of the One Time Pads techniques (e. g., [16]), whereas the pads are cre-
ated by pseudo-random sequence using a randomly created seed defined by the
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updating procedure of the vector ARV . The following theorem proves the cor-
rectness of AP2.
Theorem 2 The AP2 protocol is proactive computationally secure under the
assumption that each communication session is atomic. The security parameters
are yield by the one way function used to produce the pseudo random sequence
and by the the seed length.
Proof: Assume that the adversary is listening in all communication sessions
Si1 , . . . , Sin between the Tag and the Verifier. Even though the one way function
f which generates the pseudo-random sequence is available to the adversary,
calculating its invert f−1 is computationally infeasible . Hence, correct prediction
of the seedX [in+1] and the corresponding pseudo-random sequence c for the next
communication session Sin+1 that the adversary wishes to provide in order to
break the security system, is computationally infeasible. The probability of the
adversarial success is determined by the probability to invert f function.
The Verifier confirms the Tag authentication at each ith communication ses-
sion by revealing the keyword string from the received decrypted message si.
If the decrypted keyword string is correct, then the Verifier accepts the Tag’s
correct authentication.
We now prove the proactive feature of AP2. Assume that the adversary has
successfully broken the security system and has gotten access to the whole vector
ARV . Hence, the adversary can correctly calculate the seeds that should be used
in the following sessions. However, after the first session in which the adversary
is not present, AP2 satisfies the conditions of the information theoretic secure
protocol AP1. As a result, the information theoretic and computational security
features are restored.
The AP2’s parameters that define the pseudo-random sequence length are
the number of entries of ARV - n, the number of bits of an entry in ARV - l, and
the keyword length- k.
Note that it is possible to use the pseudo-random sequence only once in every
n successive sessions, reducing the processing required in the rest n − 1 out of
n sessions. One may view the session that uses the pseudo-random sequence as
a computational way to ensure that the adversary does not listen in (or able to
decrypt the communication) at least in one session in every n successive sessions.
6 Resistance Against Intruder-in the Middle-Attack
In this section we upgrade the computationally secure protocol AP2 in order
to be able to cope with the Intruder in the Middle Attack (IIMA), see e. g.,
[16]. This type of attack is possible when the intruder captures the encrypted
messages sent by the RFID Tag to the RFID Verifier and uses the captured
messages by replacing a modified version of them. Such IIMA may drive the
protocol to a deadlock state. We relax the assumption concerning the atomic-
ity of each communication session coping with adversarial success in performing
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IIMA that may immediately lead the RFID Tag to change the basic vector ARV .
As a result, the Verifier enters a deadlock state after which it will be unable to
send the message Open. In order to strengthen the AP2 protocol against the
IIMA we propose to use digital watermarking [2] and redundant coding [17].
Note that we do not use any cryptographic hash function as in the Message Au-
thentication Code (MAC) schemes such as [16]. The extended computationally
resistant against IIMA A˜P 2 protocol is defined in the following way. As in the
AP2 case the encryption key is derived from the basic vector ARV . The seed
Xj calculated from the corresponding vector-entry and from the seeds used in
the previous sessions, is divided now into four independent seeds X1j , X
2
j , X
3
j ,
and X4j . Each seed X
k
j , k = 1, . . . , 4, generates a corresponding pseudo-random
sequence cjk . The RFID Tag implements the following encryption scheme:
Let m be a total length in bits of the encapsulated encrypted message sj
of AP2, where m = nl + k as was defined in Section 5, v be the total num-
ber of the watermarks w1, . . . , wv added to sj , dmin be a Hamming distance of
the appropriate error detection code, and q be the number of redundant bits
r1, . . . , rq used to extend the bits of the message defined by AP2 to form a legal
codeword. Actually, the total length of the key message Yj sent during any j
th
communication session is equal to t = m+ q+ v. The resulting t bits message is
sent during the jth authentication session. sj has the following structure:
Yj = piX4
j
((LRV j‖keyword)⊕(cj11 , . . . , c
j1
m)‖(r1, . . . rq)⊕(c
j2
1 , . . . , c
j2
q )‖(w1, . . . , wv)).
Here piX4
j
determines the pseudo-random permutation of the concatenated string
((LRV j‖keyword)⊕ (cj11 , . . . , c
j1
m)‖(r1, . . . rq)⊕ (c
j2
1 , . . . , c
j2
q )‖(w1, . . . , wv)).
The pseudo-random sequence cj1 encapsulates the newly generated random
string LRV j concatenated with the keyword string as in the AP2 case. The
basic random string LRV j concatenated with the keyword string is extended
by error detection redundancy bits to form a legal codeword. The redundant
bits r1, · · · , rq are located after the sub-string (LRV
j‖keyword) in the message.
The pseudo-random sequence cj2 generated from the seed X2j encapsulates the
redundant bits r1, · · · , rq. The pseudo-random sequence c
j3 generated from the
seed X3j determines the watermarks w1, . . . , wv values that are located after the
code redundant bits in the composed string message. cj3 is created as v bits
length sequence, while each watermark is 1 bit in length. Finally, the pseudo-
random sequence cj4 generated from the seed X4j determines the pseudo-random
permutation pi of the composed string that includes the string (LRV j‖keyword)
encapsulated by cj1 , redundant bits r1, . . . , rq encapsulated by c
j3 , and the un-
protected watermarks. It should be remembered that cj4 should produce a per-
mutation for t = m+q+v bits length sequence (in fact X4j may deterministically
define a permutation as suggested in [5]).
The advantage of this approach is that the original string (LRV j‖keyword)
and the corresponding redundant bits r1, · · · , rq are encapsulated and, therefore
protected in an independent way. The redundant code that can be effective in
the key string protection against IIMA must have a sufficiently large Hamming
distance [17]. Assume that the adversarial goal is to corrupt the key message and
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to change the transmitted vector that should update the vector ARV . In order to
succeed in his/her attempt, the adversary must change the original string, that
is, change a correct codeword, to another correct codeword string. The larger
the code Hamming distance is, the smaller the probability for the adversary to
succeed without changing watermarks.
Any linear block code with a large Hamming distance may fit. The great
advantage of linear codes is that they can be easily implemented in hardware
based on Linear Feed-Back Registers [17]. Since our schemes are based only on
xor and pseudo-random sequences, we consider the code which is based on the
composition of log(nl) xor checks [13]. This code is defined as the composition
of log(nl) parity checks while the redundant bits in each dimension are equal to
the xor of the corresponding bits of the (LRV j‖keyword) string. The Hamming
distance of this composed code is equal to log(nl) + 1 [13]. The code’s construc-
tion is as follows: the original string is represented as the log(nl)-dimensional
hypercube while the redundant parity check bits are added in each dimension.
The overhead of the redundant bits is equal to q = log(nl) · log(nl)+1
√
(nl)log(nl).
The resistance against IIMA of the extended A˜P 2 protocol is based on the
following observations.
Assume that the adversary has changed the bits of a certain message sj = Yj
that has been sent by the RFID Tag during the communication session Sj . Let
us evaluate the probability PA of the adversarial success.
Assume that the encryption scheme is well known to the adversary. The
unique information that is not recovered by the adversaey is the Xj number and
the seeds X1j , X
2
j , X
3
j , X
4
j generated from it.
The seed X4j produces a pseudo-random sequence; hence, from the adver-
sarial point of view any bit has the same probability of being a watermark.
Therefore, the probability that the adversary will corrupt a watermark while
changing the bits of sj is equal to α =
v
t
. In order to successfully change the
part of the original message sj, the adversary has to corrupt at least dmin bits
of sj that are the random bits of (LRV
j‖keyword). Based on the assumption
concerning the uniform distribution of the watermark bits, the probability of
the adversarial succeess is bounded by PA ≤ (1− α)
dmin . PA may be as small
as possible by choosing large enough vector ARV dimension n, number of the
artificially inserted watermarks v, and number of redundant bits q used to obtain
a large Hamming distance dmin between any two codewords.
Note that there is a trade-off between the n, k, v, l, and dmin values and
minimization of PA. Let us consider the following example. Assume that the
artificially inserted watermarks occupy half of the encrypted message providing
α = 12 . Assume that the redundant code is the composition of log(nl) xor-based
parity check codes. Then the code minimal distance is dmin = log(nl) + 1. The
probability PA of the adversarial success is evaluated as:
PA ≤ (
1
2 )
log(nl)+1 = 12·n·l . For large enough n and l, PA will be negligible.
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7 Conclusions and Extensions
We presented a secure authentication protocol that is based on the assumption
that among any n consecutive interactions between the RFID Tag and the RFID
Verifier there is at least a single session in which the adversary was not listening
in. This model is not perfect; nevertheless it takes into account the restricted ca-
pabilities of the real world RFID adversary. Actually, AP1 provides information
theoretic security guarantees.
The AP2 protocol loosens the assumption of the RFID adversary’s weakness.
It provides computational security in a proactive manner. The computational
security of AP2 is provided by involving basic arithmetic operations and using
small size memory. The larger are the vector’ARV entries, the generated pseudo-
random sequence is closer to a real random sequence ([14]).
The updated protocol A˜P2 provides computationally secure resistance also
against IIMAs, loosening the session atomicity assumption. Its computational
security power strictly depends on n the size of the vector ARV , the overhead of
the artificially inserted watermarks, and error detection power of the redundant
code.
Note that one can use symmetric authentication scheme to obtain mutual
authentication of the Tag and the Verifier. For example, we may double the
number of entries in the vectors of the Tag and the Verifier and use one entry to
authenticate the Tag and the next entry to authenticate the Verifier. The mutual
authentication version may support production of random numbers by one or
both sides. In case of one sided production (say by the Verifier) the random
number that should be used by the Tag is sent to the Tag as part of the message
from the Verifier.
If a specific application requires the Tag and the Verifier’s synchronization,
our protocols should be extended by the Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ)
mechanism. The current session number should be sent by the Tag as part of
the encrypted authentication message, and the Verifier has to ACK the reception
of the authentication message with a certain number in an encrypted manner, as
well. In order to keep the Tag and the Verifier in synchronous state, the session
sequential number and the ARQ mechanisms should be carefully incorporated
in the presented protocols.
The AP1 and AP2 protocols can be used in the case of multiple RFID Tags
and a single RFID Verifier. In order to provide secure communication the RFID
Verifier has to store different vectors and to share a unique vector with each
RFID Tag. As a matter of fact, the limitations imposed on the number of RFID
Tags are only related to the limited storage capabilities of the RFID Verifier.
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